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primary jurisdiction has had limited application in Oklahoma and under
Oklahoma precedents, the concept arguably would have been inapplicable to
the situation involved in Stipe because of the private-public distinction.
Neither basis seems to be convincing when the benefits of the doctrine are
considered.
In future decisions, the Oklahoma Supreme Court should consider
adopting a more liberal application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction so
that the expertise of administrative agencies in Oklahoma can be fully utilized and so that uniformity of decision will be encouraged. A starting point
would be in cases involving determination of well costs.
Shirley Ann Flies
Editor'sNote: As this issue went to press, Crest Resources & Exploration Corp. v. Corporation Commission"' was decided by the Oklahoma
Supreme Court. In the opinion, Justice Opala, in considering the legal consequences of the costs estimate of a pooling order, stated: "If a dispute does
arise as to the reasonableness of the expenditures to be charged, the Commission retains primary jurisdiction to adjudicate finally the liability attachable
to the interest holders.""' Here, Justice Opala cited Stipe v. Theus.", The
jurisdiction of the Corporation Commission was not at issue in Crest
Resources and, therefore, Justice Opala's reference to primary jurisdiction is
obiter dictum. However, his use of the term is a clear indication that the concept will be applied by name in the future and, thus, an understanding of it
would be beneficial to all.

Constitutional Law: The Impact of Branti v.
Finkel on Political Patronage Employment
Since President Andrew Jackson uttered the famous words, "To the
victors belong the spoils," political patronage employment has played a controversial role in American government-' Its abuse in the nineteenth century
led to widespread criticism and eventual reform, culminating in the creation
3
of the Federal Civil Service System' and its state counterparts. As a result,
" 617 P.2d 215 (Okla. 1980).
,' Id. at 218.
46

Id. at n.5.

' Despite popular opinion, political patronage did not originate with Jackson. Its first
use occurred during the term of Thomas Jefferson. See D. ROSENBLOOM, FEDERAL SERVICE AND
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (1971).

2 In 1883, Congress enacted a Federal Civil Service System by passage of the Pendleton
Act. The Civil Service system is outlined in 5 U.S.C. § 1101 (1970).

See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), for a representative list of state
statutory provisions enacting merit systems. Oklahoma's provisions establishing a merit system
for state personnel are found in 74 OKLA. STAT. §§ 801 et seq. (1971).
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modern civil service regulations place the majority of government jobs under
and prohibit selection and dismissal of employees
a competitive merit system
4
for political reasons.

Nevertheless, political patronage employment remains well established
at all levels of government. From the county courthouse to the White House,
elected officials may hire and dismiss numerous employees on the basis of
political belief or affiliation. 5 However, a recent United States Supreme
Court decision, Branti v. Finkel,6 may limit their ability to do so in the
future.
In Branti the Supreme Court held that the first amendment prohibits
the dismissal of political patronage employees solely on the basis of political
belief or party affiliation unless the hiring authority can demonstrate that
party affiliation is an appropriate job requirement. 7 Consequently, an elected
official may not replace his predecessor's appointees with members of his
own political party unless their jobs require compatible political belief.
The following analysis demonstrates Branti's significant impact on
patronage employment. Because of its strict requirements and uncertain
guidelines, Branti is likely to restrict greatly the permissible use of patronage
employment. To understand Branti's significance, it is necessary first to examine the Court's prior decision regarding patronage dismissals and then
analyze Branti by examining the facts of the case, the elements of the test established therein, and the application of that test to future patronage conflicts.
The Court's Prior View: Elrod v. Burns
Branti is the Court's second decision regarding the constitutionality of
political patronage dismissals. In Elrod v. Burns,8 the Court held that
patronage dismissals for political reasons violated the first amendment protection of freedom of association unless the dismissed employee held a confidential or policy-making position. 9
In Elrod several Republican employees of the Cook County, Illinois,
sheriff's office alleged their first amendment rights were violated when the
newly elected sheriff, a Democrat, dismissed them. Their dismissals occurred
when they refused to affiliate with or obtain sponsorship from the
Democratic party."0 The Court determined their first amendment right of
' See D.

ROSENBLOOM,

EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP

FEDERAL SERVICE AND THE

DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC

(1971).

5Id.
6

100 S. Ct. 1287 (1980).
Id. at 1287.
427 U.S. 347 (1976).

Id. at 372.
To avoid dismissal, the Elrod plaintiffs were required to pledge their political
allegiance to the Democratic party, work for the election of its candidates, contribute a portion
of their wage;, or obtain the sponsorship of a Democrat. Id. at 355.
"
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political association had been violated and declared patronage dismissals infringed upon an individual's freedom. In doing so, the Court strongly
criticized the practice of political patronage and concluded, "The cost of the
practice of patronage is the restraint it places on freedom of belief and
association."'
Despite its critical view of patronage, the Court recognized that there
may be some instances in which it is appropriate. Patronage is appropriate,
according to the Court, when the employee holds a confidential or policymaking position. Thus, the Court determined a patronage employee could be
dismissed for political reasons without violating his first amendment rights if
he held a confidential or policy-making job.' 2 Because the Elrod plaintiffs
were non-policy-making employees,' 3 they did not meet the requirements of
this exception.
The Elrod decision is important to understanding the impact of Branti
for two reasons. First, its strong criticism of patronage, reiterated in Branti,
indicates the Court's likely strict application of first amendment protections to
patronage. Second, the confidential or policy-making exception in Elrod was
specifically restricted in Branti. Instead, Branti permits dismissals for
political reasons only when political affiliation is an appropriate requirement
for the job in question, regardless of the policy-making or confidential
nature of that job. That Branti thus establishes a narrower and stricter test is
apparent from an examination of the facts of the case.
Branti v. Finkel
In Branti the Court again considered a claim that patronage dismissals
violated the first amendment rights of the employees. Aaron Finkel and Alan
Tabakman were assistant public defenders in Rockland County, New York.
Both were Republicans who had held their positions for several years. Each
had been appointed under the local patronage system, which authorized the
public defender to select assistants to serve at his pleasure. The office of
public defender was also a patronage position, appointed by the majority
party in the county legislature. In January, 1978, the term of the public
defender who appointed Finkel and Tabakman expired. During his term, the
Democratic party had gained a majority in the legislature; consequently, a
Democrat, Branti, was appointed to replace him.
Upon taking office, Branti terminated six of his predecessor's nine appointees, including Finkel and Tabakman.' 4 Finkel and Tabakman then
sought a permanent injunction to prevent their dismissal. Claiming their termination was based solely on their political affiliation, they alleged their
Id.
,2 Id. at 372.
" The employees were a chief deputy of the Process Division, a bailiff/security guard, a
process server, and an office clerk. Id. at 350-51.
1 100 S.Ct. 1287 (1980).
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dismissal violated the first amendment guarantee of freedom of political
association."
The district court applied the Elrod test and determined the employees
held neither policy-making nor confidential positions. According to the
court, an assistant public defender's duty is limited to client representation.
Consequently, he is not involved in policy-making decisions. Although the
attorney-client privilege involves confidentiality, the court determined the
Elrod test was limited to a confidential relationship between the employee
and his employer. The court found no confidentiality in the assistant public
defender's relationship with the public defender other than the defender's
knowledge of his assistant's caseload. The court concluded that this limited
confidentiality was insufficient to meet the Elrod test.16 Consequently, the
dismissals were held to violate the employees' first amendment rights, and
the injunction was granted.' 7 The decision was affirmed by the United States
Court of Appeals.

8

On appeal to the Supreme Court, defendant Branti advanced two
arguments for reversal. First, he alleged the assistant public defenders were
confidential employees. Second, he argued that Elrod was limited to situations in which an employee was coerced into changing party affiliation in
order to retain his job rather than those in which the employee was required
to obtain party sponsorship. 9 Rejecting both arguments, the Supreme Court
affirmed the decision. In doing so, however, the Court determined the
policy-making or confidential nature of the job is not the ultimate question
in determining the constitutional permissibility of a patronage dismissal.
Although the Court agreed with the lower courts' findings that assistant
public defenders are neither policy-making nor confidential employees, it
20
held their dismissal unconstitutional on the basis of a different test.
Elements of the Branti Test
The test of confidentiality or policy making, according to the Court, is
inadequate because all positions of that kind do not require compatible
political affiliation. On the other hand, the Court noted, some non-policymaking jobs may require political compatibility. 2' Consequently, the Court
determined the correct test is whether political affiliation is a necessary job
requirement. According to the Court: "In sum, the ultimate inquiry is not
whether the label 'policymaker' or 'confidential' fits a particular position;
rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the
Finkel v. Branti, 457 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
Ild. at 1291-92.
, Id. at 1293.
"

20

21

Finkel v. Branti, 598 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1979) (unpublished memorandum opinion).
100 S.Ct. 1287 (1980).
Id.

Id.
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public office involved." 2 In formulating the test, the Court discussed five
additional principles to be applied in determining the permissibility of a
patronage dismissal.
First, the Court recognized that, in some instances, political affiliation
may be an appropriate requirement for government employment. If an
employee's private political beliefs would interfere with his effective job performance, his first amendment rights may be required to yield to the state's
interest in maintaining governmental efficiency. Consequently, the hiring
authority may infringe upon his rights by requiring compatible political affiliation. Thus, the Court determined a demonstration of the need
for such
23
reasons.
political
for
dismissal
patronage
a
permits
compatibility
Second, the Court emphasized that the interest served by requiring
political compatibility must be governmental rather than partisan.2 4 Furthermore, the balance between that interest and the employee's first amendment
rights must weigh heavily toward gains in government efficiency. According
to the Court, a small gain does not outweigh the employee's rights. 25
Next, the Court declared that the burden of proving a state interest is
on the hiring authority. Unless the government can demonstrate an interest
of vital importance requiring that the employee's private beliefs conform to
those of the hiring authority, his beliefs cannot be the sole basis for depriving
26
him of continued employment.
In addition, the Court said a dismissed employee need not prove he was
coerced into changing his party affiliation for fear of losing his job. According to the Court, the employee claiming a first amendment violation is required to show only that his dismissal was based solely on political grounds
27
rather than on incompetency or other valid bases.
Finally, the Court reiterated its Elrod view that an employee's
knowledge that his position is a patronage appointment does not constitute a
waiver of his first amendment rights. Knowingly accepting a patronage job
does not affect the right to retain that job when the hiring authority is replaced. 8
In summary, the Branti test permits patronage dismissals when the hir-

ing authority can demonstrate an overriding interest in requiring compatible
political affiliation for the job in question. That interest must be governmental rather than partisan, and it must outweigh the need to preserve the

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Id., n.12.

25 Id.
26

Id.

27

Id.

11Id. at 1288. Branti had argued the dismissed employees had no reasonable expectation
of being rehired when control of the office shifted to the Democratic party. Consequently, he
alleged their knowledge that their jobs were controlled by patronage constituted a waiver of their
rights.
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employee's first amendment rights. To claim a violation of his rights, an
employee need not prove he was coerced into changing political affiliation.
Neither does he waive his rights by knowingly accepting a patronage position.
To fully understand the implications of the test and its future application, it is necessary to examine the Court's rationale in Branti. Because Branti is based on well-established first amendment principles that the Court applied to patronage employment, it is likely to be strictly followed.
The BrantiRationale: The FirstAmendment and PatronageEmployment
Elrod and Branti are the only cases in which the Court has applied the
first amendment to political patronage employment. However, the Court has
repeatedly interpreted the first amendment rights of public employees in
general. Those interpretations were applied in Elrod and Branti and provide
the rationale for the Court's decision.
According to the Court, the first amendment protects public employees
2 9
from discharge on the basis of what they say as well as what they believe.
The Constitution thus protects a public employee's freedom of association,
including his right to affiliate with the political party of his choice.3 0
Furthermore, the Court has determined the government may not deny a
benefit to an individual on a basis that infringes upon his constitutional
rights.3 Thus, the government may not deny its employees a job or salary
because of the exercise of free speech or association. In fact, the Court has
said the "denial of benefit" principle becomes particularly significant when
first amendment rights are involved.32
In public employees' rights controversies, the Court has also applied its
long-standing view that an overriding state interest may justify infringement
of first amendment rights." While the Court has determined even a significant interference with protected rights of political association may be permitted if that interest exists,3 ' it has strictly applied this principle. According to
the Court, the state must demonstrate a sufficiently important interest and
must employ means "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement of
associational freedoms. ' 3 Furthermore, the Court has declared that any

29 Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183 (1952); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
31 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973); NAACP

v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
3
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
31

Id. at 597-98.

" See Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
3, See Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
3, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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governmental action that may curtail freedom of association is subject to the
"closest scrutiny." ' 6
In both Elrod and Branti, the Court applied these principles to political
patronage employees. According to the Court, political patronage restrains
freedom of belief and association because an employee is required to compromise his views to retain his job. 7 The Court noted that some patronage
systems require employees to contribute financially to the hiring authority's
political party. Others require active campaigning for that party's
candidates. 3 8 If the employee does not share the beliefs of that party or its
candidates, his beliefs are thus compromised if he must engage in such activities to retain his job. On the other hand, most patronage systems require
only that the employee be a member of the hiring authority's political party.
In such cases, the Court also found a serious infringement on freedom of
political association. According to the Court, "Even a pledge of allegiance to
another party, however ostensible, only serves to compromise the
individual's true beliefs." '3 9 Thus, an employee who must change party
registration to retain his job encounters an infringement of his associational
freedom.
The Court's application of freedom of association and the "denial of
benefit" principle to patronage employment thus led to the strict test in
Branti. Although the government may demonstrate an overriding interest in
requiring compatible political affiliation for patronage jobs, that interest
must be governmental rather than partisan. Furthermore, that interest will be
viewed with the closest scrutiny because an infringement of first amendment
rights is involved. According to the Court, that infringement occurs because
patronage employment severely restricts freedom of association.
However, the Branti test permits patronage dismissals if political affiliation is shown to be an appropriate requirement for the job in question.
Consequently, determining the instances in which political affiliation is considered appropriate is critical to understanding the full impact of Branti.
Applying the Branti Test
After Branti, a newly elected official planning to replace his
predecessor's patronage employees with those of his own choice is confronted with a dilemma. He may not dismiss employees for political reasons
unless he can demonstrate that their jobs require compatible political affiliation. The political affiliation required must also serve a governmental, rather
than a partisan, interest. Essentially, the official must determine the positions

16Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 75 (1975); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460

(1958).

, Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 355 (1976).
38 Id.

11 Id. at 355.
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which the Court is likely to regard as appropriately requiring political affiliation.
Brant. provides few guidelines for making this determination. The
Court notes that determining the need for compatible political affiliation in a
given position is a difficult process,"0 but it provides little assistance. As
Justice Powell notes in his dissenting opinion, "The standard articulated by
the Court is framed in vague and sweeping language certain to create vast
uncertainty."'" The few examples provided by the Court are designed to
demonstrate that the policy-making and confidentiality criteria of Elrod are
inadequate to determine when a patronage employee may be dismissed for
political reasons. According to the Court, all confidential positions do not require political affiliation. On the other hand, some nonconfidential jobs
without policy-making duties may require political affiliation.2
To illustrate this view, the Court provides three examples: an election
judge, a state university football coach, and a gubernatorial aide. An election
judge generally is appointed according to legislative requirements prescribing
one representative from each political party. Although the position involves
no policy making, political affiliation is an appropriate job requirement, according to the Court, because the legislature prescribes it. On the other hand,
a football coach is a policy maker whose job has no relation to partisan
politics. Finally, a gubernatorial press aide, speech writer, or legislative
liaison is a. confidential and policy-making employee whose work may
3
justifiably require compatible political affiliation.'
Since Branti involved an assistant public defender, the Court also discussed the applicability of political requirements to that position." The
Court noted an assistant public defender representing indigent defendants is
often required to oppose the government and its policies to perform his job
effectively. Consequently, the Court concluded that it would undermine,
rather than promote, the effective job performance of a public defender to
make his tenure dependent upon his allegiance to the dominant political
5

party.4

However, the Court declined to apply the same reasoning to a prosecutor or his assistants.' 6 The Court contrasted the role of a public defender

1100 S.Ct. 1287 (1980).
41 Id. at 1289. In contrast, Elrod provided general guidelines for determining when a job

is confidential or policy making in nature. The Court stated: "The nature of the responsibilities
is critical. . . . An employee with responsibilities that are not well-defined or are of a broad
Ecope more likely functions in a policymaking position. In determining whether an employee occupies a policymaking position, consideration should also be given to whether the employee acts
as an adviser or formulates plans for the implementation of broad goals." 427 U.S. 347, 367-68
(1976).
42 100 S.Ct. 1287 (1980).
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46

Id., n.13.
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with the "broader public responsibilities of an official such as a
prosecutor, 4 7 but it specifically declined to express an opinion on the propriety of political party affiliation as a criterion for selecting or dismissing
prosecutors."'
These examples are the Court's only guidelines for determining when
party affiliation is an appropriate job requirement. The positions mentioned
provide little assistance in making this important determination. The example
of a football coach is of little use as a guideline because it is not related to
governmental work. While an election judge is a common patronage role, it
is a part-time position involving work only on election days. On the other
hand, a gubernatorial aide is a good example of a patronage position likely
to lead to the dismissals considered in Branti. The Court notes that a governor may justify the need for hiring personal aides who share his political affiliation or philosophy. The aide who writes the governor's speeches, supervises his contact with the press, or represents his views to legislators may,
according to the Court, be required to share the governor's views in order to
perform his duties effectively." However, the Court clearly states that the
justification for political affiliation is not based on the confidential or policymaking nature of the job.o It must be justified by demonstrating that
political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for effective job performance. Because no test is prescribed for this determination, it is difficult to
ascertain when political affiliation requirements may be justified.
Lacking concrete guidelines, the hiring authority must follow the
general rules of Branti: the necessary demonstration of an overriding state interest in requiring political affiliation, the requirement that the interest must
be governmental rather than partisan, and the requirement that the state
must employ the means least restrictive of freedom of association in promoting that interest. 5 Yet these criteria pose questions left unanswered by
the Court. When is an interest governmental rather than partisan? What
means are considered least restrictive of freedom of association?
Apparently, the Court intends these questions to be answered on a caseby-case basis. The Court's acknowledgment that the determination is difficult and its recognition that each job may differ indicate its intention to
treat each case individually. However, the Court's announced disfavor of
patronage employment indicates a strict application of the test. Thus, the
lack of concrete guidelines coupled with the Court's negative view of
patronage present difficulties for a hiring authority faced with the possibility
of dismissing patronage employees. To avoid a constitutional challenge by
the dismissed employee, the authority must comply with Branti. However,
47

Id.

4

Id.

IId.
50 Id.

11See text accompanying notes 34-36, supra.
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compliance is difficult because the general guidelines must be applied to a
variety of patronage positions with many different duties.
The patronage appointments available to an Oklahoma governor present an example of the possible difficulties encountered. The legislature has
authorized the appointment of officials not subject to the state merit
system." The governor or other state official may select appointees to serve
at his pleasure. 3 Gubernatorial appointments may be made directly by the
governor or indirectly by commission or board members who have been appointed by the governor.1 Appointment procedures may vary according to
statutory authorization for the position." In some instances, the membership
of boards or commissions must include a legislatively prescribed ratio of
Democrat and Republican members'serving staggered terms so that each
6
governor is assured the opportunity of appointing some members.
Although these members generally receive no compensation, they are often
authorized to appoint a salaried director to serve at their pleasure."
A representative example of a gubernatorial appointment is the position
of State Director of the Department of Energy. By statute, the director is appointed by the governor to serve at his pleasure." The appointment is subject
to state senate confirmation." According to the statute, the department has
policy-making duties, including fuel allocation, adoption and implementation
of rules and regulations regarding fuel allocation, and implementation of
federal programs. 6" Thus, the legislature authorizes the governor's appointment of a director responsible for an agency with considerable authority.
Because of the current concern about energy, the department has a particularly important role. Consequently, a newly elected governor who has a
definite energy program with prospective regulations to be implemented
would understandably desire a director of his own selection. Faced with the
Branti test, may that governor replace his predecessor's appointee without
violating that appointee's first amendment rights?

52

§ 803 (Supp. 1976).
OKLA. STAT. § 803 (Supp.1976);

74 CKLA. STAT.

74 OKLA. STAT. § 255 (1971).
The method of appointment varies according to the statutory authority for the position. General appointment power for state officers and board and commission members is
authorized in 74 OKLA. STAT. § 255 (1971).
" See, e.g., 74 OKLA. STAT. § 1804 (Supp. 1980), authorizing the appointment of
members of the Tourism and Recreation Commission by the governor, and 74 OKLA. STAT. §
1807 (Supp. 1980), authorizing those members to appoint a director to serve at their pleasure.
See also 74 OKLA. STAT. § 3362 (Supp. 1974), authorizing the governor's direct appointment of
the director of the State Department of Energy.
"6 This procedure is common in statutes authorizing various boards and commissions,
although it is not present in all appointments.
, See, e.g., 74 OKLA. STAT. § 1807 (Supp. 1980), authorizing this appointment power
for members of the Tourism and Recreation Commission.
,1 74 OKLA. STAT. § 3362 (Supp. 1974).
"

74

"

$9 Id.

60 74 OKLA. STAT.

§ 3364 (Supp. 1980).
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To do so, he must demonstrate that the job requires compatible political
affiliation. That requirement must be based on the need to serve an overriding governmental interest. It may not be a partisan interest. Does a governor's desire to choose a director who agrees with his proposals serve a
governmental interest? Or is the interest partisan? These questions illustrate
the difficulty presented by Branti because the Court offers no answers. A
candidate's goals or campaign proposals presumably are "partisan." When
he is elected, do those proposals become governmental interests?
Because Branti does not answer these questions, it creates uncertainty
for an elected official seeking to avoid a possible suit by a dismissed
patronage employee. The problem may be compounded if that employee
seeks damages. In such instances, the Supreme Court has charged public officials with a basic knowledge of the employee's constitutional rights. 6'
Although he may have acted with the good faith belief that he was not
violating the dismissed employee's rights, the official is nevertheless liable if
the court determines he should have been aware of the violation.62 In one
case decided under Elrod, a governor was held liable for damages when he
dismissed a patronage employee for political reasons, although he claimed a
63
good faith belief that the dismissal was justified under Elrod.
The difficulties presented by Branti's lack of clear guidelines and its
narrower test indicate that fewer patronage dismissals will be permitted than
were allowed under Elrod. After Elrod, constitutional challenges to
patronage dismissals focused on the confidential or policy-making nature of
the job in question. Since Elrod permitted dismissals in such positions, the
question faced by the courts involved the definition of that role. However,
the Branti test is stricter because it does not permit all confidential or policymaking jobs to be excluded. The test is thus likely to permit fewer dismissals.
An examination of the cases decided under Elrod illustrates this conclusion. For example, a city superintendent of refuse and a county superintendent of highways were found to be permissibly terminated for political
reasons because their jobs involved policy, making. 64 Similarly, a county attorney was held to be a policy maker who could be dismissed without

61
62

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308

(1975).

63 McCormick v. Edwards, 479 F. Supp. 295 (M.D. La. 1979). In McCormick, a dismissed patronage employee sued the governor and his immediate supervisor, alleging that his
dismissal for political reasons violated Elrod. He had been appointed by the supervisor, with the
governor's approval. He was dismissed after local politicians disagreed with his actions and job

performance. The governor and supervisor argued they should not be liable for damages because
they acted in a good faith belief that he was a policy-making employee exempt from the Elrod
decision. However, the district court determined the good faith requirement held officials to a
basic knowledge of constitutional rights. The test was determined to be objective, rather than
subjective. Consequently, the district court found the defendants liable for damages.
64 Loughney v. Hickey, 480 F. Supp. 1352 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
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violating his first amendment rights. 5 On the other hand, a law enforcement
planning council district director was found to have no policy-making duties.
Consequently, his dismissal was a violation of his rights .
Under the Branti test, it seems unlikely the superintendents of refuse
and highways could be dismissed because it would be difficult to demonstrate
that political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for such jobs, despite
their policy-making nature. Because the Branti Court did not apply the test
to prosecutors, 7 the propriety of dismissing the county attorney is difficult
to resolve. On the other hand, the example of the law enforcement director
might meet the Branti test if the hiring authority could demonstrate that his
job involved implementation of goals serving a governmental interest.
Predicting the outcome of these cases under Branti is obviously speculative. Nevertheless, the fact that Branti does not permit the exception of confidential or policy-making employees limits possible dismissals in the future.
The stricter test coupled with the unclear guidelines for determining the propriety of p6litical requirements will diminish the number of permissible
patronage dismissals.
However, the effect of Branti may be offset by the nature of the proof
required to establish that a dismissal occurred for political reasons.
Therefore, it is important to examine the burden of proof in such cases.
The Burden of Proof
As indicated, the Court in Branti specifically states that a dismissed
employee need not show he was coerced into changing political affiliation in
order to prove his termination was based on political grounds.68 The Court
does not elaborate on the burden of proof required to establish a politically
motivated termination. However, an examination of the evidence presented
in Branti is helpful in determining the necessary proof.
In Branti the district court decision was based primarily on its examination of the local Democratic party's patronage procedures. The evidence
showed the hiring decisions were made by Democratic legislators or chairmen
in accordance with a procedure established by the local party caucus. 69Essentially, the procedure required each appointee to have the sponsorship or
recommendation of the caucus or its members. The district court determined
that the procedure excluded from consideration, with one exception, all
potential employees who were not Democrats. 70 The court concluded that the

65 Catterson v. Caso, 472 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1979).
66 McCormick v. Edwards, 479 F. Supp. 295 (M.D. La. 1979).
67 See text accompanying note 46, supra.

See text accompanying note 27, supra.
Finkel v. Branti, 457 F. Supp. 1284, 1288 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
70 The court did not discuss the reason one non-Democrat was selected but noted only
one of the nine appointees was not sponsored by the caucus. Id. at 1288.
OS
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only reason for dismissing Finkel and Tabakman was their failure to obtain
recommendation or sponsorship of Democrats.7 '
The defendant Branti had alleged the dismissals were not politically
motivated but were based on good cause because both dismissed employees
were incompetent. However, the district court noted he had previously labeled
both men as "competent attorneys" who had been "satisfactorily performing their jobs."' 72 Consequently, his allegations were given no weight.
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Branti also argued that the employees
had failed to meet the Supreme Court's test of proof articulated in Mt.
Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle." According to
Mt. Healthy, an employee claiming his termination violates the first amendment must prove that his constitutionally protected activity was a
"motivating factor" in the decision not to rehire him. 7 4 Furthermore, no first
amendment violation exists if the hiring authority demonstrates it would have
terminated the employee in the absence of the constitutionally protected conduct.75 In Branti the Court determined the test of proof was met because
Branti had previously said the employees were competent attorneys. Having
presented this proof, the employees were found to meet the requirements of
Mt. Healthy.7 6
The Court did not elaborate on the application of Mt. Healthy in Branti
or future patronage dismissal cases. Since the Branti proof was limited to
evidence of a patronage procedure excluding nonparty members with competent work records, it appears similar proof would be sufficient in future
cases. In Branti the Court noted a hiring authority may still dismiss an
employee for incompetence, insubordination, or other good cause. 7 In the
absence of these grounds, the hiring authority must prove the dismissed
employee's job required political compatibility.
Prior to Branti, one commentator predicted the Mt. Healthy requirement would bar many dismissed patronage employees from seeking constitutional relief.7 8 While Branti appears to make this less likely, the possibility
exists that a hiring authority could fabricate a poor work record to justify
dismissing a patronage employee. However, the Court's strong disfavor of
patronage may result in a narrow application of the test and a strict view of
any justification for dismissals.
If the proof burden of Mt. Healthy does not present a significant barrier to challenges of patronage dismissals, it appears the stringent re7 Id. at 1288.
72

Id. at 1293.

7 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
" Id. at 287.
" Id.

Branti v. Finkel, 100 S.Ct. 1287 (1980).
Id., n.14.
" Comment, Patronageand the First Amendment After Elrod v. Burns, 78 COLuM. L.
REv. 468 (1978).
.76
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quirements of Branti will permit fewer dismissals. A reduction in the use of
patronage is a likely result. However, appointments would remain available
as a resul: of normal attrition. Whether Branti's standards are applicable to
patronage hiring is thus an additional question for consideration.
The Application of Branti to PatronageHiring
Although both Elrod and Branti dealt with patronage dismissals, the
Court in both decisions discussed the inherent first amendment infringements
resulting from patronage in general. The Court's broad criticism of
patronage practices, detailed in Elrod" and reiterated in Branti,1° goes
beyond the question of dismissals. The Elrod decision led one commentator
to predict its inevitable application to hiring,' and the dissent in both opinions strongly criticized the majority for its unnecessary attack on
patronage. 82
In Branti, Justice Powell's. dissent criticized the majority because the
question presented was limited to dismissals. Consequently, he questioned
the need or propriety of the majority's broad criticism of patronage.83
Similarly, Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Elrod agreed that nonpolicy-making employees could not be constitutionally dismissed for political
reasons but disagreed with the plurality's extensive discussion of the questionable constitutional validity of patronage in general.84
In both opinions, the Court referred to patronage hiring and dismissal
as inherently in conflict with first amendment rights. The Branti majority
stated: "[[]t is difficult to formulate any justification for tying either the
selection or retention of an assistant public defender to his party
affiliation."" The Court also quoted with approval the district court's questioning of the propriety of any political considerations in the selection of
86
public defenders.
Because the Court is obviously reluctant to approve patronage practices, it appears likely the restraints applied to dismissals might also be applied
to hiring. Although the holding is limited to dismissals, the rationale appears
equally applicable to hiring practices. That this is the likely result of Branti is
Justice Powell's argument in his dissenting opinion. His comments are important to understanding the potential impact of Branti.

Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 353 (1976).
Branti v. Finkel, 100 S.Ct. 1287 (1980).
Comment, Patronageand the First Amendment After Elrod v. Burns, 78 COLUM. L.
REv. 468 (1978).
82 Branti v. Finkel, 100 S.Ct. 1287 (1980); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 379 (1976).
" 100 S.Ct. 1287-88 (1980).
Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 374-75 (1976).
Branti v. Finkel, 100 S.Ct. 1287 n.14 (1980) (emphasis added).
80

8I

Id.
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NOTES
The Branti Dissent

Justice Powell's strong criticism of the majority view focused on the
state's substantial interest in maintaining political patronage employment and
the majority's failure to consider that interest. That failure is detrimental to
our governmental system, he argued, because Branti will significantly reduce
the use of patronage. According to Powell, three interests are served by
patronage: first, patronage strengthens political parties; second, patronage
preserves the electorate's indirect role in policy making; and, third, patronage
preserves the electorate's freedom to structure their government by their elecwhom they entrust with the power to appoint other
tion of officials
7
officials.1
Powell first argued that patronage enhances the political party system,
and he noted that the Court has previously recognized preservation of
political parties as an important goal. Since patronage is a means of rewarding the party faithful, according to Powell, it enhances interest and activity
on the part of voters. Furthermore, he noted that patronage serves to
strengthen voter awareness and interest in public offices having low
visibility.18
Next, Powell noted the Court's failure to recognize the state interest in
preserving patronage because of the role it plays in policy implementation. In
particular, voters play an indirect role in policy making by selecting candidates whose goals they approve. To carry out those goals, elected officials
depend upon appointed employees sharing their views. Loyalty to the official
and his political beliefs thus requires political compatibility and the ability to
select and dismiss employees. Without that ability, an elected official's
opportunity to pursue goals is thwarted. As a result, the indirect influence of
the voters is also diminished. Powell noted that limited patronage is required
to preserve this role. Thus, he concluded that the Court had placed "unnecessary constraints upon the ability of responsible officials to govern effectively and to carry out new policies." 9
Finally, Powell argued that Branti will limit the electorate's role in
structuring its government. He pointed to the voters' role in electing some officials, while entrusting them with the duty of appointing others. According
to Powell, Branti removes this right from the electorate and places it in the
hands of the judiciary. As a result, the judicial branch will determine the
propriety of appointing and dismissing patronage employees. Powell concluded that this results in an intrusion by the judiciary upon an area of
legislative and policy concern. 9'
Justice Powell's emphasis on the importance of patronage to the preservation of policial parties is his least persuasive argument because the expan'1

Id. at 1287-88.

88 Id.

IId. at 1288.

0 d. at 1287, quoting with approval Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Elrod.
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sion of civil service systems has diminished parties' reliance on patronage for
this purpose. On the other hand, his argument that the state has an interest in
preserving the electorate's indirect role in policy making is particularly persuasive.
In Elrod the state's interest in insuring the voters' indirect role in policy
making was recognized. The Court noted that voters influence policy making
by electing candidates whose policies they endorse. Because those policies
would be frustrated by key employees opposing their implementation, elected
officials must have some freedom to select key personnel who share their
views. According to the Court, limited patronage is thus permissible to insure
that "representative government not be undercut by tactics obstructing the
implementation of policies of the new administration." 9 1 Recognizing that
interest, the Court in Elrod permitted patronage dismissals for confidential
and policy-making employees. Thus, the Elrod test was based upon the
balance of the state's interest against the infringement upon the employee's
freedom of association. 2
The Branti test is not similarly balanced because the Court specifically
noted that all confidential employees are not required to have compatible
political affiliation with the hiring authority. In fact, the Court specifically
based its opinion on the belief that the true test is whether political affiliation
is an appropriate requirement for the job, regardless of its policy-making
duties. Having made this determination, the Court did not address the state
interest in preserving the role of voters in policy implementation. Because of
the Court's failure to do so, the preservation of this interest is uncertain after
Branti.
If, as Powell predicts, the decision signals the demise of patronage, the
voters' role will diminish. Removed from the electoral process, public
employees have little accountability to the public. As a result, voters have
limited influence on policy making and implementation of programs. The
growth of civil service systems and the increased government bureaucracy
have diminished the voters' influence. Lack of public input into government
decisions is currently a subject of voter concern. If patronage is limited, as
Powell predicts, voter input will be further decreased because decisionmaking employees may not be removed from office for political reasons. An
elected official's argument that a particular job requires political compatibility because he must have a loyal employee to carry out the voters' chosen
policies may not be viewed as a "governmental" interest. Candidates' platforms are generally regarded as partisan, and the elected official's goals may
not be regarded as governmental if the courts apply the strict view prescribed
by Branti.
9,Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976). Prior to Elrod, commentators critical of
patronage recognized the need for its limited use to preserve this interest. See Schoen, Politics,
Patronage and the Constitution, 3 IND. LEGAL FORUM 35 (1969); Comment, Patronage
Dismissals: -ConstitutionalLimits and PoliticalJustifications,41 U. Cn. L. REv. 297 (1974).
" Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367 (1976).
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NOTES
Conclusion

Three aspects of Branti are significant to the future of political
patronage employment. First, the Court established a stricter test for permissible patronage dismissals. Second, the Court held that dismissed
employees need not prove they were coerced into changing parties to prove a
politically motivated dismissal. Finally, the Court did not balance the new
test against the recognized state interest in permitting limited patronage
dismissals.
The strict requirements of the Branti test, coupled with the uncertain
guidelines for compliance, will reduce the number of permitted patronage
dismissals in the future. Although the decision involves only dismissals, it appears equally applicable to patronage hiring procedures. Consequently, it
may reduce the permissible use of patronage hiring as well.
The Court determined an employee need not prove coercion to
demonstrate that his dismissal was politically motivated. Although this appears to make the employee's proof burden easier than that implied in Elrod,
he must show that political reasons were the sole basis for his dismissal. An
employee may still be dismissed for incompetence or other good cause. While
the proof requirement may bar some challenges, it appears the Court's
negative view of patronage will result in a strict application of the test. Thus,
the courts may be more likely to consider employee challenges.
If the impact of Branti significantly decreases patronage employment,
the state's recognized interest in preserving the voters' indirect role in policy
making will be detrimentally affected. The Branti departure from permitting
dismissals of confidential or policy-making employees restricts an elected official's ability to implement programs because he may not be able to justify
the dismissal of his predecessor's appointees.
The Court's criticism of many patronage practices is certainly valid. To
the extent those practices coerce political beliefs by requiring campaign contributions or similar activities, they should be restricted. However, the misuse
of patronage does not necessarily dictate the restrictions imposed in Branti.
Unless the Court desires the complete dissolution of all patronage, it is unnecessary to impose such stringent requirements.
The Elrod decision permitting patronage dismissals for confidential or
policy-making employees is a more effective means of limiting patronage.
While it prohibits unfettered patronage dismissals, it permits the elected official to select key personnel sharing his views. Thus, it serves the state interest in preserving the voters' indirect role in government. The uncertain
future of this role after Branti is perhaps the decision's most serious result.
If the Court provides clearer guidelines for applying Branti, these problems may be solved. However, the lack of those guidelines renders uncertain
the constitutional validity of many state appointment procedures. The
resulting uncertainty may be resolved by future Court decisions regarding
patronage. In particular, a clarification of the permissible dismissal of key
personnel is needed, and a return to the exception for confidential employees
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